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 Abstract 
 
In this paper we propose a new time series empirical test to identify housing 
bubble periods. Our test estimates the beginning and the burst of bubbles as 
structural breaks in the difference between the appreciation rates of the Case-
Shiller price tiers. We identify the relevant periods by exploiting the common 
characteristic that lower-tier house prices tend to rise faster during the boom 
and fall more precipitously during the bust. We implement our test on 15 U.S. 
Metropolitan Statistical Areas during the most recent housing bubble.   
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1 Introduction 
The recent housing boom and bust in the United States was marked by large differences in the 
run-up and the subsequent decline of housing prices both across metro areas and across 
market segments in the same area. One common phenomenon observed in many metro areas 
is that the low-tier homes realized the largest price gains during the boom and saw the sharpest 
declines during the bust of the market. There is now a consensus in the rapidly growing 
empirical literature on the housing boom and bust that subprime lending and low interest rates 
were major contributing factors to the bubble (see e.g., Mayer 2011 for a recent survey). These 
factors, however, have a differential effect on the price tiers. Landvoigt, Piazzesi, and Schneider 
(2011) present a theoretical model in which movers of different age, income and wealth, 
demand houses that differ in quality. These three dimensions of mover characteristics and the 
quality of houses are then mapped into an equilibrium distribution of house prices. Applying 
micro data on buyer characteristics and house prices from San Diego to this model, Landvoigt 
et al conclude that “cheap credit for poor agents was most important in generating higher capital 
gains at the low end of the market.”  The links between lending behavior by banks, default rates, 
and real estate prices have been studied theoretically in a recent paper by Hott (2011).  This 
model explicitly accounts for the relationship between lending practices by banks and housing 
prices and explains why housing prices exhibit cyclical movements. It is important to note that 
asymmetries in the movements of different housing tiers appear when credit is extended to a 
varying degree in the different segments of the housing market. It is also plausible to assume 
that these asymmetries continue to persist, or are even exacerbated under alternative 
(behavioral) assumptions regarding the lending behavior of banks, i.e. mood-swings, 
momentum forecasts, and disaster myopia (see Hott 2011, pp. 35-42). 
 In this paper, we present a new empirical test for the existence of housing bubbles which 
exploits the specific feature that low tier homes appreciate more during the boom and fall faster 
during the bust of the market.  We use time series data of the S&P home price tiers to identify 
the exact dates at which housing market bubbles emerge and burst. Our methodology does not 
require information on market fundamentals. Instead, it analyzes the differences in the rate of 
change of the tiered price indices to identify breaks, which correspond to the origin and the burst 
of the bubbles. 
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We implement our empirical test on the metropolitan areas covered by the Case-Shiller 
tiered price indices.1 The procedure allows the data to endogenously dictate the breaks, which 
mark the beginning and the end of the housing market bubbles. The results show that from the 
metropolitan areas considered in the analysis, all bubbles started between June 1997 (with 
Seattle, WA) and May 2001 (with Washington DC). Moreover, all bursts occurred between June 
2006 (in San Diego, CA and Tampa, FL) and July 2008 (in Portland, OR). The bubble that 
lasted the longest was the one in Seattle, between June 1997 and July, 2007. It was in the San 
Diego metropolitan area where the high-tier prices went up the most, increasing by 134.5% 
(between January, 1999 and June, 2006). In other cities the increase in high-tiered prices was 
less severe. For example, in Minneapolis the increase was 48.4% (between November, 2000 
and September, 2007), while in Portland it was 56.3% (between June, 1997 and November, 
2008). Within the same city, the appreciation in the low-tier prices was greater. In San Diego the 
increase was 236.4%, while in Minneapolis and Portland the increase was 81.4% and 115.5%, 
respectively. 
The extant literature on market bubbles has taken two distinct approaches to identify 
bubbles. The main approach views bubbles as a rapid and unsustainable growth in asset prices 
that cannot be explained by “fundamental” factors. In his summary article on the symposium on 
bubbles, in the Journal of Economic Perspectives, Stiglitz wrote that “[I]f the reason that the 
price is high today is only because investors believe that the selling price will be high 
tomorrow—when "fundamental" factors do not seem to justify such a price—then a bubble 
exists” (Stiglitz, 1990, p. 13). Using this definition, a number of empirical tests have been 
developed to exploit the link between asset prices and various fundamental values. West (1987) 
proposes an empirical test for the existence of a bubble using the constant expected return 
model. His approach relies on comparing two sets of parameters. One set of estimates is 
obtained by a projection of stock prices based on past dividends, and the other is obtained by a 
set of equations describing the discount rate and the dividend process. This and other tests to 
identify bubbles are reviewed in Flood and Hodrick (1990). Meese and Wallace (1994) examine 
whether the real expected return on home ownership is close to the real homeowner cost of 
capital by studying the relationship between price, rent, and the cost of capital. Abraham and 
Hendershott (1993 & 1996) study the relationship between housing prices and construction 
cost, real income growth and interest rate. They find that these factors explain half of the 
                                                           
1
 The S&P Case-Shiller home price indices are calculated from data on repeat sales of single-family homes and 
organized in three equally sized tiers depending on their resale value. 
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historical variation in house price appreciation. The bubble, then, manifests itself in the 
“sustained serially correlated deviations,” yet, it remains unclear whether these deviations are 
due to a “bubble” or to a misspecification of the econometric model. Himmelberg, Mayer and 
Sinai (2005) compare the level of housing prices to local rents and incomes for a period of 25 
years. They explain that changes in the price-to-rent and price-to-income ratios might suggest 
the existence of bubbles even when the houses are reasonably priced because they fail to 
account, for example, for differences in risk, property taxes and maintenance expenses, and 
anticipated capital gains from owning a home. Glaeser, Gyourko and Saiz (2008) present a 
theoretical model of housing bubbles which predicts that areas with more elastic supply will 
have fewer bubbles with shorter duration and smaller price run-ups. Their data indicate that the 
price increases in the 1980s were almost exclusively experienced in areas with inelastic supply. 
The existence of speculative bubbles of real estate assets has been recently examined for 
real estate investment trusts (REITs) markets. Walters and Payne (2007) develop econometric 
approaches for detecting the presence of (positive and negative) periodically collapsing bubbles 
(see Evans, 1991) for four classes of REITs: equity, mortgage, hybrid, and all REITs. They find 
evidence of negative periodically collapsing bubbles in which prices fall significantly below the 
asset’s fundamental value. 
The alternative approach to the analysis of bubbles, promoted by Case and Shiller, views 
housing bubbles as a result of unrealistic expectations of future prices sustained by speculative 
feedback and social contagion. In addition to the analysis of “fundamentals” —including 
personal per capita income, population, and employment— for the time period 1985-2003, Case 
and Shiller (2003) present the results of a survey of people who bought houses in 2002. This 
survey asked respondents a set of questions about their expectations of future prices and 
whether they feared that houses will become unaffordable in the future. The article reports that 
the term “housing bubble” had essentially no popularity prior to 2002 while the term “housing 
boom” had been in much more frequent use since the 1980s. An extensive overview of these 
approaches to understanding housing bubbles, and housing dynamics in general, is presented 
in Mayer (2011). 
Recent tests for speculative bubbles in regional US housing markets typically consider 
deviations from market fundamentals. Goodman and Thibodeau (2008) explore to what extent 
house appreciation rates over the time period 2000-2005 can be attributed to economic 
fundamentals, and what portion can be attributed to speculation. According to these authors 
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much of the appreciation is due to inelastic supply, and speculative motives are present in less 
than half of the cities they examine. Mikhed and Zemčík (2009) present a panel test to detect 
bubbles using price-rent ratios for the period 1975-2006. The bubble indicator they construct 
detects bubbles around the decade turn in the late 1980s and the early 1990s as well as around 
the end of the 1990s. Peláez (2012) argues that the housing bubble in the late 1990s and the 
early 2000s could have been predicted when considering the unprecedented growth rate of the 
house price to per capita income ratio. 
The main innovation in this paper lies in identifying bubbles without observing fundamentals 
and without the reliance on surveys or on measurements of sentiment. This approach can be 
implemented in housing markets due to the availability of the tiered price indices.  
Defining the relevant periods in which bubbles grow and collapse opens new venues for 
future research on the impact of fundamentals on housing price movements both in and outside 
of the bubble periods. There is a rapidly growing strand in the recent literature on housing price 
dynamics which tries to identify the effects of various fundamental values on prices. Using 
simulation of the US housing market, Khandani, Lo, and Merton (2007) find that the declining 
interest rates and the growth of the refinancing business contributed significantly to the recent 
housing boom and the massive defaults during the bust. Favilukis (2010) argues that much of 
the housing price appreciation can be explained by relaxation of credit constraints and Mayer 
and Sinai (2009) show that markets with the highest subprime lending experienced the greatest 
growth in price-to-rent ratios. In contrast, Glaeser, Gottlieb, and Gyourko (2010) present 
evidence supporting the view that easy credit, in the form of low real interest rates and 
permissive mortgage approval standards is not a strong contributor to the rising house prices. 
Our approach permits these relationships to be revisited in the context of the relevant time 
period in each metropolitan area because we do not use fundamental factors to determine the 
bubble periods. 
The organization of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we describe the data.  The 
empirical model, the estimation methods, and the identification strategy are outlined in Section 
3.  Section 4 presents the estimation results and Section 5 concludes. 
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2 Data and Intuition of the Testing Methodology 
The data utilized in this paper are the time series S&P Case-Shiller seasonally adjusted Tier 
Price Indices. Our study covers the time period between January 1992 and August 2011 with 15 
Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSA): Atlanta, Boston, Chicago, Denver, Los Angeles, Miami, 
New York, Minneapolis, Phoenix, Portland, San Diego, San Francisco, Seattle, Tampa, and 
Washington DC. For each MSA we have three indices, the Low-,  Medium-, and High-Tier.2 
The indices we employ are constructed using a three month moving average, where home 
sales pairs are aggregated in rolling three month periods. This methodology assures the indices 
account for delays in data recording at the county level.3 As is detailed in S&P Indices (2011), 
for the construction of the three tier indices, the S&P Case-Shiller methodology selects price 
breakpoints between low-tier and middle-tier houses and price breakpoints between middle-tier 
and upper-tier houses. The breakpoints are smoothed through time to eliminate seasonal and 
other transient variation. Depending on the sale prices, a transaction is allocated to one of the 
three tiers. 
[Figure 1, here] 
To illustrate the dynamics of the price tiers during the period of study, we present in Figure 1 
the Low-, Mid-, and High-Tier indices for four of the metropolitan areas: Chicago, New York, 
San Diego, and Tampa. All indices are adjusted to have January 1992 as the base month. Two 
apparent observations can easily be made from examining these figures. First, all tiers 
increased during the housing bubble years and then decreased once the housing bubble 
busted. And second, the low tier increased the most during the bubble period, and decreased 
the most once the bubble burst. The vertical lines mark the beginning and end of the bubble and 
in the following section we will discuss how they are estimated. 
[Table 1, here] 
                                                           
2
 While S&P Case-Shiller also constructs the indices for Cleveland and Las Vegas, we dropped them from our 
sample because Las Vegas did not have information prior January 1993, and Cleveland only had data until August 
2011. 
3
 For a more detailed discussion on the construction of the indices see Miao, Ramchander and Simpson (2011). 
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The summary statistics of the tiers for all the MSA that we examine are presented in Table 
1. The higher averages in the lower tiers are consistent with the observation that during this 
period the low tier displays a larger appreciation than the high tier.  
 
4 Empirical Strategy 
4.1 The Housing Bubble and Identification Strategy 
Let the price of a house be given by , and, following the literature on testing for speculative 
bubbles (see, e.g. Flood and Hodrick 1990), let us assume that it consists of a market 
fundamentals term,  , and a bubble term denoted by : 
  =  + .          (1) 
The bubble term , thus, represents the deviation of the current market price from the value 
implied by market fundamentals. The market price in Equation (1) can be used for different price 
tiers , 	 = 
, , , where 
, , and  denote the low, medium, and high price tear, respectively. 
Hence we can write the difference between any two price tiers as follows: 
   ≡  , − , = ,
 + , − ,
 + ,   for , 	 = 
, , , and  ≠ 	. (2) 
We want to test whether the difference in the price tiers follows a trend stationary with a 
nonzero mean process. That is, 
  lim→∞, − ,  = !" + !#$  for , 	 = 
, , , and  ≠ 	, (3) 
which implies that after taking into account the nonzero mean and trend, the price sequences 
must be cointegrated with cointegrating vector [−1, 1].   denotes the information set at time $. 
Because by the definition of the tiers there must be a difference between the prices of different 
tiers, we allow for the sequence {} to have a nonzero mean. Stationarity has an interesting 
convergence interpretation; it says that shocks to the differences in the prices have to be 
temporary and that the long-term forecast of prices in both tiers can only differ by !" + !#$ at a 
finite fixed time $. 
Combining Equations (2) and (3) we obtain, 
A Time Series Test to Identify Housing Bubbles 
8 
 
 lim→∞, − ,  = lim→∞,
 − ,
 *  +  lim→∞, − ,  
        for , 	 = 
, , , and  ≠ 	. (4) 
One concern in the identification of the housing bubbles is that the two additively separable 
components on the right-hand side in Equation (4) cannot be separately observed. We only 
observe the sequence {}. Our identification strategy models the first term on the right-hand 
side to have a nonzero mean and a constant trend. Then, any structural break in the mean and 
trend of {} is assumed to come from the second term on the right-hand side of Equation (4). 
That is, the boom and bust of the housing bubble are identified under the assumption that the 
beginning and end of the bubble cause a significant difference (a structural break in the mean or 
trend of the price difference across tiers) in the rate at which the tiers appreciate and depreciate. 
There are two scenarios in which our identification strategy would not be able to 
appropriately detect a bubble. The first one occurs when the price tiers appreciate at similar 
rates although we have a period of substantial price increases, i.e. a bubble period. The second 
one occurs when we observe a structural break in the difference of the tier prices, but this break 
is due to an asymmetric reaction of the tiers to market fundamentals that is not related to a 
bubble. Taken in the context of the recent housing bubble, however, neither of these 
hypothetical scenarios seems relevant in any of the metropolitan areas. The main reason why 
the first scenario does not apply is due to the different availability of loans. Landvoigt et al 
(2011) document that cheap credit was available to predominantly consumers at the low end of 
the distribution of houses, and Pavlov and Wachter (2011) present theory and evidence that 
aggressive mortgage lending instruments temporarily increase housing prices. Even if high tier 
and low tier buyers had the same speculative motives and desire to purchase homes, the 
affordability constraint on the high tier homes was more stringent, leading to a slower price 
growth of that tier at the beginning of the bubble. The second scenario also does not seem to 
apply as the crash of the housing market has been universally observed across all 15 
metropolitan areas in our study. 
 
4.2 Testing Methodology 
Our identification strategy has a natural testable analog in the cointegration literature that 
allows for structural breaks. In particular, we test whether the observed sequence {} is a 
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nonzero mean trend stationary with process, while allowing for structural breaks in the mean 
and trend. To do this we use the minimum LM unit root test proposed by Lee and Strazicich 
(2003) which assumes the following data-generating process:4 
  = +′, + -,  where  - = !-.# + /    (5) 
and for convenience we drop the superscript 	 in . , is a vector of exogenous variables and 
/~1 2(0, 56). We will use Model C, as in Perron (1989), which includes two changes in levels 
and trends: 
 , = [1, $, 8#, 86, 89#, 896]′  where  89: = $ − 9;: for $ ≥ 9;: + 1, = = 1,2 
       89: = 0 otherwise. 
The first break should identify the beginning of the bubble, while the second break should 
identify the bust. The two-break LM unit root statistic is obtained from the following regression: 
 ∆ = +′∆, + @AB.# + ∑ D∆AB. + EF#       (6) 
 where  AB =  − GHI − ,+B  for  $ = 2, 3, . . . , 9.,  
and where +B denotes the estimated coefficients from the regression equation of ∆ on ∆,; GH is 
given by # = ,#+B as shown in Schmidt and Phillips (1992), and ∆AB. are included as required 
to correct for serial correlation. The unit root test is described by @ = 0 in equation (4) and the 
LM test statistics are: 
 LM = 9@H, 
                                                           
4
 As explained in Lee and Strazicich (2003), one common issue in unit root tests that allow for structural breaks 
(such as the ones presented in Zivot and Andrews (1992), Lumsdaine and Papell (1997), and Perron (1997)) is that 
they assume no break(s) under the unit root null and the alternative is ‘structural breaks are present.’ This includes 
the possibility of having a unit root with break(s) (Perron (1989) and Perron and Vogelsang (1992) do allow for the 
possibility of breaks in both, the null and the alternative). This implies that the rejection of the null is rejection of a 
unit root without breaks and not necessarily the rejection of a unit root. Strazicich et al. (2004) point out that these 
endogenous break unit root tests might conclude that a time series is trend stationary, when in fact the series is 
nonstationary with break(s). To overcome this limitation the two-break minimum Lagrange Multiplier (LM) unit 
root test proposed by Lee and Strazicich (2003) has an alternative hypothesis that unambiguously implies trend 
stationary. 
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 Ñ  = t-statistic testing the null hypothesis @ = 0. 
The important element in this test is that the breaks 
P and 
Q that identify the boom and the 
bust of the bubble, are determined endogenously by the test using: 
 
P = infθ LM(T)  
 
Q = infθ Ñ(T) 
where T: = 9;:/9, for  = = 1,2, denotes the dates of the breaks relative to the total number of 
observations 9. The breaks are determined when there is more evidence of stationarity in the 
sequence {}; that is, where the test statistic is minimized. Even when the series is found to 
have a unit root, the breaks can still be used to identify significant differences in the rates at 
which the tiers appreciate or depreciate. 
 
4 Empirical Results 
For comparison purposes we first test for stationarity in the {} sequence for , 	 = 
, ,  
using two popular unit root tests that do not account for breaks, the Augmented Dickey Fuller 
(ADF) test and the Kwiatkowski–Phillips–Schmidt–Shin (KPSS) test. The results are reported in 
Table 2, where the null in the ADF is unit root and the null in the KPSS is trend stationary. The 
first two columns show the results for the difference in the mid and low tiers. At standard 
significance levels, the ADF tests—which were carried out with trend—fail to reject the unit root 
null for every metropolitan area. Moreover, the KPSS tests reach a similar conclusion, as they 
reject the null of trend stationarity at a 10% significance level for every market. A similar story is 
true for the difference between the prices of the high and middle tiers shown in the last two 
columns. The only evidence of stationarity when no breaks are allowed appears when 
comparing the prices of the high and low tiers for the Los Angeles, San Diego and Washington 
DC markets. The ADF tests for these cities reported in the third column reject the unit root null 
at a 10% significance level. Overall, the results with no breaks find very little evidence of 
stationarity and, of course, cannot identify the bubble. 
[Table 2, here] 
The first set of results that allow for breaks are presented in Table 3, where the analysis 
focuses on the difference in prices between the middle and the low tiers. These results 
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correspond to Model C that allows for two breaks in the levels and the trends. The first column 
reports the estimate of @  from Equation (4). Its LM test statistic is reported in the second 
column, while the third column has the number of lags ∆AB. included in the estimation. Given 
that we are using monthly data, the maximum number of lags we allow to correct for serial 
correlation is V = 12. Moreover, lags are being dropped if they are not different from zero at at 
least 10% significance level. 9W;# and 9W;6 denote the two key estimates of interest: the estimated 
breaks expressed in years and months. We restrict XY# and XY6 to be in the interval [0.19, 0.99] to 
assure that we have enough observations at the end and at the beginning of the sample. The 
results show that nearly all the estimated boom and bust are statistically significant at at least 
10% level. We have that for Denver the bust is not significant, and for San Francisco neither the 
boom nor the bust are significant.5 
 [Table 3, here] 
 Tables 4 and 5 report the results for the differences between the high and low tiers, and the 
high and middle tiers, respectively. In Table 4 we see that there is less evidence of stationarity 
between the high and the low tiers. Only Phoenix, Portland, and Tampa reject the unit root null. 
Moreover, there is even less evidence of stationarity in the difference between the high and 
middle tiers. Only Atlanta and Portland reject the unit root null. In terms of the significance of the 
identified boom and bust, less breaks are significant in the difference between the high and low 
tiers, where six of the thirty breaks are not significant. For the difference between the high and 
the middle tiers, just the bust for Washington DC is not statistically significant. 
[Table 4, here] 
[Table 5, here] 
We can now explain the intuition behind these results and the key idea behind the estimated 
dates for the structural breaks. Figure 1 not only shows the price indices for the low, middle and 
high tiers discussed earlier, but the vertical lines in the graphs denote the endogenously 
determined boom and bust using the difference between the high and low tiers, as reported in 
Table 4. For example, in Chicago the boom of the housing bubble started in April 1999 and the 
                                                           
5
 Comparing the results from Tables 2 and 3 we see a clear difference in terms of the stationarity of the difference 
between the middle and low tiers when allowing for breaks. While there is no evidence of stationarity when no 
breaks are allowed, the results in Table 3 show that at 10% significance level we reject the unit root null for six 
cities: Chicago, Miami, Phoenix, Portland, San Diego, and Tampa. 
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bust was in September 2006. A very similar pattern can be observed in New York, San Diego, 
and Tampa, all shown in Figure 1. The identified date of the bust for the bubbles in Tampa and 
San Diego is the same, June of 2006.  In New York the bubble busted in February 2006. Notice 
that the identified breaks are not always the same across different {} when different tiers are 
considered. We illustrate the results for the difference between the high and low tiers because it 
is this difference that was most pronounced during the housing bubble. 
The last column in Table 4 shows the percentage change in the price of the high tier homes 
between the beginning and the end of the identified housing bubbles. For example, in Chicago 
the prices of the high tier homes went up by 62.5% between April, 1999 and September, 2006.6 
The figures in this last column show that the appreciation in the high-tier prices was most 
pronounced in San Diego with an increase of 134.5%, followed by Seattle and Tampa with 
119.2% and 103.4%, respectively. The cities in which the appreciation in the high tier was lower 
were Minneapolis with a 48.4% increase and Portland with a 56.3%. The identified beginning 
and end of the bubbles are very similar across cities. The beginning of the bubbles that are 
statistically significant at a 10% level are all between June 1997 and May 2001, starting with 
Seattle and finishing with Washington DC. On the other hand, the statistically significant end-of-
bubble dates are all between June, 2006 (San Diego and Tampa) and July 2008 (Portland). 
[Figure 2, here] 
Figure 2 plots the logarithm of the difference between the high and low price tiers ([\) for 
Miami, Portland, Seattle and Washington DC.  In addition to the actual [\ series, the figures 
also show the Ordinary Least Squares fitted lines to illustrate the dates of the breaks.  The 
figures clearly show how the Lee and Strazicich (2003) procedure select the dates of the boom 
and bust of the bubbles.  While the vertical lines denote the estimated beginning and end dates, 
the downward trend in the period between the two lines shows how during the bubble years the 
low tier prices increased faster than the high tier prices.  Once the bubble bursts, the break in 
                                                           
6
 Notice that the Lee and Strazicich (2003) methodology allows for the identification of only two breaks, while 
some of the series appear to have more than two. In those cases (i.e., Atlanta, Denver, Los Angeles, Phoenix, and 
San Francisco) one of the identified breaks may correspond neither to the beginning nor the end of the bubble. 
Hence, in those cases we do not report the percentage increase in the prices of the high tear. 
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the trend shows how the lower tier prices dropped at a much higher rate than the high tier 
prices.7 
 
6. Conclusion 
The traditional approach to test for housing market bubbles is to examine deviations from 
market fundamentals. This paper presents an alternative approach that does not rely on an 
analysis of fundamental values. Instead, we exploit the property that low tier homes increase at 
a faster pace during the boom and depreciate more during the bust. This insight serves as a 
basis for the development of our empirical strategy which employs cointegration techniques that 
allow for structural breaks to estimate the dates of boom and bust of the bubbles. Using data for 
15 metropolitan areas we find that the estimated breaks resemble quite closely the beginnings 
of the price increases and the subsequent downfalls of the housing prices. 
Our paper offers new insights on the dynamics of housing market prices. On the one hand, it 
suggests that the misalignment in the appreciation rates of the home price tiered indices can be 
a symptom for a regime change in the borrowing and lending behavior of market agents. On the 
other hand, this misalignment can be interpreted as an indication for an ensuing market bubble. 
That is, the question of whether we are currently in a housing bubble can be addressed through 
a comparison of the appreciation rates of the tiers. By identifying the beginning and the ending 
of the housing bubbles and the intensity with which they occur without using market 
fundamentals, our paper provides opportunities for future research on the impact of market 
fundamentals on housing prices inside and outside of bubble periods.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
7
 Figure 3 in the appendix show the [\ sequences for the other 11 cities, including Atlanta, Denver, Los Angeles, 
Phoenix, and San Francisco, where the procedure cannot correctly identify the beginning or end of the bubbles.  
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Figure 1. 
Low, Mid and High Tiers Indexes, 1992-01 through 2011-08. 
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Figure 2 
Differences Between High and Low Tiers with Breaks, 1992-01 through 2011-08. 
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Figure 3 - Appendix 
Differences Between High and Low Tiers with Breaks, 1992-01 through 2011-08. 
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Table 1 
Summary Statistics 
             
  
Mean St.Dev Min Max 
   
Mean St.Dev Min Max 
Atlanta 
     
Boston 
    
 
[, 144.9 27.9 99.3 193. 
  
[, 188.0 60.2 99.6 271.8 
 
], 144.5 27.0 100.0 189.4 
  
], 187.7 67.2 99.9 288.7 
 
\, 155.0 38.4 88.6 24.5 
  
\, 208.3 89.7 94.5 350.4 
Chicago 
     
Denver 
    
 
[, 152.6 36.8 100.0 217.7 
  
[, 188. 48.8 100.0 254.8 
 
], 157.1 42.1 100.0 235.7 
  
], 208.0 57.5 100.0 275.3 
 
\, 171.4 52.6 99.5 271.7 
  
\, 247.8 80.3 100.0 342.5 
Los Angeles 
    
Miami 
    
 
[, 150.4 62.6 78.6 266.1 
  
[, 166.0 66.2 97.5 3153 
 
], 156.1 72.4 79.6 304.8 
  
], 183.7 84.3 99.4 379.7 
 
\, 156.7 83.1 76.6 347.0 
  
\, 202.8 110.9 98.2 70.0 
New York 
     
Minneapolis 
   
 
[, 173.1 59.4 99.6 264.8 
  
[, 163.1 44.2 100.0 237.7 
 
], 177.1 69.1 99.6 293.3 
  
], 176.7 53.8 100.0 266.2 
 
\, 189.7 84.9 98.4 338.9 
  
\, 189.2 71.2 100.0 311.7 
Phoeni 
     
Portland 
    
 
[, 179.6 68.9 100.0 341.7 
  
[, 169.5 47.3 99.0 264.1 
 
], 166.7 63.4 99.3 324.6 
  
], 199.5 63.1 100.0 319.7 
 
\, 180.5 82.3 99.2 386.3 
  
\, 265.1 101.3 100.0 452.4 
San Diego 
     
San Frncisco 
   
 
[, 164.3 65.9 88.7 281.5 
  
[, 176.5 63.9 94.6 283.3 
 
], 171.1 75.6 88.5 314.3 
  
], 178.9 73.0 93.8 317.8 
 
\, 182.2 92.0 86.5 366.6 
  
\, 176.9 88.0 89.1 368.8 
Seattle 
     
Tampa 
    
 
[, 170.7 55.1 99.5 279.3 
  
[, 148.6 49.0 97.7 261.2 
 
], 174.9 58.7 100.0 21.6 
  
], 164.1 62.1 9.2 311.1 
 
\, 200.4 72.9 99.7 348.8 
  
\, 195.7 91.2 98.0 412.2 
Washington DC 
          
 
[, 161.1 57.8 99.2 26.5 
       
 
], 159.6 62.4 98.7 285.2 
       
 
\, 162.8 72.0 97.4 319.6 
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Table 2 
Differences across Tiers with No breaks. ADF and KPSS tests, 1992-01 through 2011-08. 
 
]\ ≡  ], − \, 
 
[\  ≡  [, − \, 
 
[]  ≡  [, − ], 
 
ADF KPSS 
 
ADF KPSS 
 
ADF KPSS 
Atlanta -0.255 0.378
c
 
 
-0.027 0.395
c
 
 
-0.244 0.424
c
 
Boston -1.324 0.265
c
 
 
-1.332 0.266
c
 
 
-0.890 0.257
c
 
Chicago 0.083 0.329
c
 
 
-0.995 0.270
c
 
 
-0.810 0.214
c
 
Denver -1.081 0.500
c
 
 
-1.057 0.489
c
 
 
-1.225 0.391
c
 
Los Angeles -2.353 0.171
a
 
 
-2.598
a
 0.194
b
 
 
-1.898 0.211
b
 
Miami -1.078 0.244
c
 
 
-1.884 0.233
c
 
 
-0.369 0.208
b
 
New York -2.093 0.231
c
 
 
-1.930 0.240
c
 
 
-1.965 0.241
c
 
Minneapolis -0.771 0.378
c
 
 
-0.404 0.412
c
 
 
0.042 0.456
c
 
Phoenix -1.736 0.316
c
 
 
-1.592 0.315
c
 
 
-1.204 0.272
c
 
Portland -0.421 0.466
c
 
 
-0.463 0.411
c
 
 
-0.843 0.215
b
 
San Diego -1.499 0.255
c
 
 
-2.582
a
 0.247
c
 
 
-1.813 0.214
b
 
San Francisco -1.381 0.268
c
 
 
-1.792 0.268
c
 
 
-1.368 0.254
c
 
Seattle 0.361 0.392
c
 
 
-0.452 0.262
c
 
 
-1.225 0.157
a
 
Tampa -1.138 0.251
c
 
 
-1.314 0.260
c
 
 
-0.700 0.266
c
 
Washington DC -2.313 0.146
b
 
 
-2.711
a
 0.165
b
 
 
-1.989 0.179
b
 
Notes: Null hypothesis in the ADF is unit root. Null hypothesis in the KPSS is trend 
stationary. 
a
, 
b
, and 
c
 denote significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
, , 
and  denote low, medium, and high tear, respectively. The critical values for the KPSS 
test are 10%: 0.119,  5% : 0.146,  1% : 0.216. 
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Table 3 
       Differences in Mid and Low (]\ ≡  ], − \,) with Breaks, 1992-01 through 2011-08. 
 
@W Test 
Statistic 
VW 9W;# 9W;6 XY# XY6 
Atlanta -0.126 -3.037 12 2000-01 2009-02 0.42 0.90 
Boston -0.217 -4.637 12 1997-12 2005-04 0.31 0.70 
Chicago -0.286 -5.724
b
 7 1995-12 2008-04 0.21 0.86 
Denver -0.138 -4.592 12 1997-03 2003-05
d
 0.27 0.60 
Los Angeles -0.044 -4.237 12 1995-11 2004-02 0.20 0.64 
Miami -0.220 -6.254
b
 10 2006-03 2008-06 0.75 0.86 
New York -0.189 -4.977 9 2001-09 2005-10 0.51 0.72 
Minneapolis -0.165 -4.606 10 1999-10 2007-11 0.41 0.83 
Phoenix -0.204 -6.460
c
 8 2006-10 2008-03 0.78 0.85 
Portland -0.421 -6.636
c
 12 1998-06 2009-02 0.34 0.90 
San Diego -0.104 -5.360
a
 12 1998-03 2006-08 0.33 0.77 
San Francisco -0.080 -3.881 11 2004-03
d
 2009-01
d
 0.64 0.89 
Seattle -0.184 -4.540 11 1994-02 2008-04 0.11 0.86 
Tampa -0.308 -5.753
b
 7 2000-08 2006-05 0.45 0.75 
Washington DC -0.148 -5.057 10 2002-01 2007-10 0.53 0.83 
Notes:  VW is the optimal lagged first-differenced terms, 9W;: for = = 1, 2 denotes the year 
and month of the estimated break points and XY: = 9W;:/9  for = = 1, 2  denote the 
location of the breaks. 
a
, 
b
, and 
c
 denote significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
d
 denotes that the identified break point is not significant at the 10%. 
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Table 4 
       
  
Differences in High and Low ([\  ≡  [, − \,) with Breaks, 1992-01 through 2011-08. 
 
@W Test 
Statistic 
VW 9W;# 9W;6 XY# XY6 %∆\, %∆[, 
Atlanta -0.188 -4.049 12 2001-01 2009-02 0.47 0.90   
Boston -0.122 -4.358 12 1997-12 2004-08
d
 0.31 0.66 166.6% 96.6% 
Chicago -0.265 -4.600 11 1999-04 2006-09 0.38 0.77 90.8% 62.5% 
Denver -0.146 -4.588 11 2002-09 2007-10 0.56 0.83   
Los Angeles -0.032 -3.761 11 1995-11 2003-10 0.20 0.62   
Miami -0.148 -4.717 11 2000-12 2007-09 0.47 0.82 196.6% 79.4% 
New York -0.226 -5.155 9 2000-11 2006-02
d
 0.47 0.74 129.9% 70.4% 
Minneapolis -0.142 -4.124 12 1999-10 2007-08 0.41 0.82 81.4% 48.4% 
Phoenix -0.345 -7.211
c
 8 2007-04 2008-12
d
 0.80 0.89   
Portland -0.284 -5.919
b
 12 1997-03
d
 2008-07 0.27 0.87 115.5% 56.3% 
San Diego -0.063 -5.175 11 1999-01 2006-06 0.37 0.76 236.4% 134.5% 
San Francisco -0.064 -3.096 10 2003-12 2008-08
d
 0.63 0.87   
Seattle -0.132 -3.845 12 1997-06 2007-07
d
 0.29 0.81 156.9% 119.2% 
Tampa -0.271 -5.516
a
 7 2000-07 2006-06 0.45 0.76 208.6% 103.4% 
Washington DC -0.078 -3.640 10 2001-05 2007-07 0.49 0.81 143.3% 61.8% 
Notes:  VW is the optimal lagged first-differenced terms, 9W;: for = = 1, 2 denotes the year and month of the 
estimated break points and XY: = 9W;:/9 for = = 1, 2 denote the location of the breaks. a, b, and c denote 
significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
d
 denotes that the identified break point is not 
significant at the 10%. 
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Table 5 
       Differences in High and Mid ([]  ≡  [, − ],) with Breaks, 1992m01 through 2011m08. 
 
@W Test 
Statistic 
VW 9W;# 9W;6 XY# XY6 
Atlanta -0.468 -7.105
c
 11 2001-06 2009-01 0.50 0.89 
Boston -0.118 -4.016 5 1998-10 2005-08 0.36 0.72 
Chicago -0.116 -3.253 12 2001-06 2008-07 0.50 0.87 
Denver -0.162 -4.516 5 2003-06 2008-03 0.60 0.85 
Los Angeles -0.078 -4.024 12 1998-05 2006-09 0.33 0.77 
Miami -0.140 -4.040 6 2000-10 2007-07 0.46 0.81 
New York -0.214 -5.258 12 2000-11 2006-12 0.47 0.78 
Minneapolis -0.256 -4.599 11 2000-11 2007-09 0.47 0.82 
Phoenix -0.270 -4.831 12 2004-09 2009-02 0.67 0.90 
Portland -0.240 -5.694
a
 12 1997-06 2008-11 0.29 0.89 
San Diego -0.094 -4.057 11 2001-01 2006-10 0.47 0.78 
San Francisco -0.151 -4.606 7 2000-09 2007-05 0.46 0.81 
Seattle -0.240 -4.991 12 1997-03 2008-06 0.27 0.86 
Tampa -0.304 -4.848 10 2001-12 2007-10 0.52 0.83 
Washington DC -0.056 -3.659 11 2002-09 2008-09
d
 0.56 0.88 
Notes:  VW is the optimal lagged first-differenced terms, 9W;: for = = 1, 2 denotes the year 
and month of the estimated break points and XY: = 9W;:/9  for = = 1, 2  denote the 
location of the breaks. 
a
, 
b
, and 
c
 denote significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
d
 denotes that the identified break point is not significant at the 10%. 
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